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THE PROBLEM OF THE NEW AND SMALL
NATIONAL-STATES IN CENTRAL AND
SOUTHERN EUROPE: A SUMMARY
SURVEY

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I. INTRODUCTION

Never before in history has a peace congress been faced with such extensive problems in the matter of reconstructing the political map of Europe. Even the treaties of Westphalia, Utrecht and Vienna seem petty in their territorial redistributions as compared with the changes which the present conference must bring about, regardless of the nature or the justice of the details of the settlement. In view of the immense importance of the problems involved in the settlement of the conflicting national claims, for both the present and the future, it has occurred to the writer that a brief but comprehensive historical and ethnographic survey of the contested districts might be of value in serving as the background against which to estimate in a critical manner the results of the work of the peace conference. While it is obvious that an article covering so many problems in so short a space will lack utterly in originality, it may at least possess the merit of being relatively comprehensive and complete as regards the major aspects of the question. As far as it has been humanly possible, the writer has kept his own opinions wholly in restraint and has endeavored to base all assertions upon evidence of the highest reliability and impartiality. Upon matters of detail, which may be contested, no opinions have been expressed, for our information is often in such cases relatively incomplete and the exact facts can be discovered

only through a local investigation by a field commission of experts.¹

II. THE OPPRESSED NATIONS ON THE EVE OF THE WAR

In the following brief survey of the European nations not completely united and emancipated, one is justified in omitting any discussion of the case of the Irish, the French in Alsace-Lorraine, the Danes in Schleswig, or the Italians of the Irredenta district, as either too well known to demand any special consideration or as questions concerning the solution of which there can be no debate as to the larger issues involved. Attention may be centered upon that confused field of thwarted national aspirations and conflicting national claims which extends from the head of the Gulf of Bothnia on the north to Crete on the south, and from the Erz Gebirge on the west to the delta of the Danube on the east.

The northernmost of these oppressed nations are the Finns of Finland Esthonia and northern Livonia.² Orig-

¹ For a survey of the historical development of the problems of nationality and nationalism, which would serve as the logical introduction to this article, the reader may be referred to the article on "Nationalism: Its Historical Development," in the forthcoming edition of the *Encyclopedia Americana*.

² The citing of authorities for every statement in this brief sketch of the submerged nations would not only be pedantic and wearisome, but quite impossible within the space limitations imposed. A general note of indebtedness must suffice. For all matters concerning racial distribution I have relied upon W. Z. Ripley's *Race of Europe*, the most brilliant American contribution to European ethnography, always keeping in mind his convincing demonstration in Chapter II of the lack of any definite correlation between race, language and nationality. On the question of language distribution the chief authority has been Leon Dominian's, *The Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe*. The guides chosen in the field of the general problems of nationality in this district have been A. J. Toynbee's *Nationality and the War*, Stoddard and Frank, *The Stake of the War* and the several detailed works of R. W. Seton-Watson, as well as his brilliant summary of these problems in the chapters he contributed to the coöperative volume on *The War and Democracy*. The admirable chapter by James Bryce on "Nationality" in his *Essays and Addresses in Wartime* has also been very helpful, as have the many valuable and scholarly articles in *The New Europe*, *The Journal of Race Development*, *The Current History Magazine*, *The Atlantic Monthly*, *The National Geographic Magazine* and other leading contemporary journals. The brief historical sketches are

inally constituting the stock which inhabited most of the great plain of Russia, they have been forced north against the Lapps by the successive invasions of Slavs from the south. They were converted to Christianity by Bishop Henry, an English missionary, in the middle of the twelfth century. In the fourteenth century Finland was annexed to Sweden and about 1350 Denmark, which had controlled Esthonia, surrendered it to the Teutonic Knights. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the vigorous Swedish monarch, Gustavus Adolphus, obtained for Sweden both Esthonia and Livonia. While the Swedes were able to control the Finns politically for a considerable period, they were never able to impose their culture upon their Finnish subjects beyond inducing them to accept Swedish Protestantism. In 1721, by the Treaty of Nystad, Peter the Great obtained for Russia Esthonia, Livonia and part of Finland, and by 1809 Russia had secured complete political control of all the Finnish peoples. For some ninety years thereafter the Finns enjoyed practical cultural autonomy, but in 1899 the advocates of the Russification policy of Pan-Slavism induced Nicholas II to extend these measures to Finland. The Finns, however, took advantage of the weakness of the czar in the revolution of 1905 and compelled him to restore the Finnish constitution and to consent to the many liberal political reforms proposed by the Finns. A revival of Russification policy by the Russian bureaucracy in 1913-14 was terminated by the outbreak of the World War, but was probably instrumental in inducing the Finns to declare their independence from Russia in December, 1915. From the racial standpoint Ripley, the leading authority on the racial distribution of Europe, holds that the Finns are a branch of that primordial Nordic stock which inhabited the region now known as

drawn mainly from the recent and scholarly manual on medieval history by Lynn Thorndike and from the excellent surveys of modern history in the works of Hayes, Hazen, Robinson and Beard, Andrews, Seignobos, Fyffe and Schapiro, as well as special articles in historical and critical journals. Details regarding population and religion have been obtained from the above mentioned works and from the *Statesman's Year Book* and articles in recent and authoritative encyclopedias.

Russia and from which have been differentiated the Teutonic, Letto-Lithuanian and Finnish types. The Nordics were pressed north by the invasions of the Alpine Slavs from the southwest. The Finns, having been massed against the extremely broadheaded Lapps in the north and intermarried with them, have acquired a tendency towards broadheadedness which was quite unknown in the original stock and is practically absent among the Finns of the Baltic provinces of Esthonia and Livonia who have not been brought into proximity with the Lapps. In recent times there have been three languages used in Finland, the Swedish in commercial and international relations and to a considerable degree in culture and religion, the Russian as the official speech, and the Finnish as the national language. The Finns number some three and a half millions of people, of whom about two and a half millions live in Finland. In 1910 an authoritative estimate put the proportion of Finnish-speaking peoples at 88 per cent and at least that proportion are of a definite Finnish stock. In religion the Finns are overwhelmingly Lutheran. The strength of the national bond between the Finns of Finland and their kinsmen in the Baltic provinces can only be determined when the confusion and conflicting claims growing out of the present war have subsided.

Living next to the Finns of Esthonia are the Letts and the Lithuanians who inhabit the Baltic provinces of southern Livonia and Courland and their hinterland. The Letts dwell in the Baltic coast region and the Lithuanians in the adjacent inland districts. While the Letts and Lithuanians are physically identical and linguistically and culturally closed allied, their history has been at least slightly different. That this variation began only after they had been pushed up towards the Baltic by the oncoming Slavs cannot be doubted. The conquest and colonization of the Letts by the Teutonic Knights was begun in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The Letts followed the Order into an acceptance of Lutheranism, but after the Order was dissolved in 1526 the Letts were later partitioned between Poland and Sweden. It was not long, however,

until the Letts were united with the Lithuanians in a common subjection to Russia. By the Treaty of Nystad in 1721 Livonia was ceded by Sweden to Russia and Courland was obtained by the third partition of Poland. Lithuania has had a much more distinguished history. At the opening of the fourteenth century it was a great non-Christian duchy stretching from the Baltic provinces on the north to the Black Sea on the south. In 1386 its Grand Duke, Jagello, married Jadwiga, daughter of the king of Poland, accepted Roman Catholicism for himself and his subjects and became King of Poland as Wladyslaw II. This purely personal union was changed into a constitutional one by the Union of Lubin in 1569. The merger with Poland was never popular, however, with the Lithuanians, and in accordance with the principle of national self-determination this historical union could in no way be used as a basis for a claim to Lithuania on the part of the restored Polish state. Lithuania constituted the majority of that part of Poland which went to Russia in the partitions from 1772 to 1795. Until 1876 it was allowed a large amount of cultural autonomy, but after that date the Russification policy was pursued with the usual result of only increasing the national sentiment of the Lithuanians. Racially the Letts and Lithuanians are identical, both being branches of the same primordial Nordic race from which the Teutons and Finns were also differentiated. The Lithuanian language is one of the most interesting in Europe, being the best preserved representative of the so-called "Aryan" type. It is said that the intelligent Lithuanian peasant has little difficulty in reading Sanscrit. The Lettish language differs but slightly from the Lithuanian. Religion is the chief point of division between the Letts and Lithuanians. While some Letts belong to the Greek Church and some Lithuanians are Protestants, the vast majority of the Letts are ardent Lutherans and the Lithuanians are overwhelmingly Roman Catholic. Their Roman Catholicism is the only thing which the Lithuanians have in common with the Poles. It is generally estimated that there are about two and a half millions of Lithuanians and a

million and a quarter of Letts, though in the official Russian censuses they are lumped together as all Lithuanians.

Of all the nations freed by the war Poland can, perhaps, claim the most notable and romantic past. Little is known of the origins of the Poles—a Slavic people—before the foundation of the vast Polish kingdom embracing most of central Europe by Boleslaw the Brave (992–1025). This abortive domain was divided in 1139 and not reunited until 1320. In the middle of the thirteenth century the Teutonic Knights began their missionary work and colonization among the Poles and succeeded in converting them to Roman Catholicism. The military success of the Knights was not as marked as their theological progress; twenty-four years after the personal union with Lithuania under Jagello, the Poles and Lithuanians utterly defeated the Knights in the battle of Tannenberg. In 1683 John Sobieski, king of Poland, relieved Vienna and saved central Europe from the Mohammedan. The complete union with Lithuania at Lublin, in 1569, gave Poland assurance of an ample territory, but the state was so beset with fatal weaknesses that decline was inevitable and ultimate extinction invited. The kingdom was extensive but lacked distinct or defensible boundaries; there were serious religious and racial diversities; gross political, social and economic inequalities existed; the constitutional arrangements invited anarchy; and the control by foreign kings resulted in the exploitation of Polish interest. The first partition between Prussia, Austria and Russia in 1772, while unjustified on the part of the partitioning powers can stir little sympathy, but not so with the second and third partitions in 1793 and 1795. In the twenty-one years that had intervened the Poles had eliminated many of the fatal economic and political weaknesses that had previously endangered their national existence and had given promising evidence of being on the eve of a far-reaching political renaissance, but the avaricious czarina, Catherine II, would tolerate no strong Slavic state obstructing Russian contact with the west and she arranged the outrageous partitions of 1793 and 1795 which terminated the political independence of Poland. The national hope

of the Poles were temporarily revived by Napoleon's creation of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, in 1807. Still more promising was the establishment, in November of 1815, of a Kingdom of Poland by the then liberal czar, Alexander I. This embraced much of the old kingdom of Poland and was favored with the most liberal political constitution then in existence in Europe, but the Poles desired complete political independence and could not resist the contagion of the revolutionary movement that swept over Europe in 1830. Their revolt was speedily suppressed and the short-lived kingdom was united with Russia. Encouraged by the growth of nationalism in Germany and Italy and by the benevolent but treacherous attitude of Napoleon III, the Poles made one last desperate attempt in 1863 to obtain their freedom. This rebellion was crushed with even greater ease than the revolt of thirty-three years earlier, and a most brutal and thorough-going punishment was meted out to the gallant rebels. That policy of Russification then began, by means of which the Russians have since tried without avail to crush the national aspirations of their Polish subjects. The one extenuating compensation which the Poles have enjoyed since 1863 has been the fact that the coming of the industrial revolution to Russia made Poland the center of Russia economic life. That part of the Polish nation which was included within the Kingdom of Prussia—a part of upper Silesia, Posen, West Prussia and the Masurian district of East Prussia—has met with oppression only less severe than that which their kinsmen received from Russia. But the rigorous religious, educational and agrarian policy of Bismarck and Bülow only served to stir the resentment of the Poles and to reanimate their national spirit. Only in Austrian Galicia were the Poles accorded that degree of autonomy and liberal treatment which has made them partially satisfied to dwell in political subjection to another state. The Poles are a branch of the Slavic division of the Alpine race, but are much less broadheaded than their Czech and Slovak neighbors on the south, or even the Russians to the east. Their contact with so many different peoples has caused a

considerable prevalence of racial intermixture. Their language is a distinct western Slavic dialect. In religion over three-fourths of the Poles are Roman Catholic. The only notable exception is to be found in the three hundred thousand Protestants in the Masurian Lakes district of East Prussia. The most liberal estimates of the number of Poles in Europe at the outbreak of the war put it at about twenty-three millions, of whom some three million five hundred thousand live in Germany, about four and a quarter millions in Austria and the remainder in Russia.

Stretching from southeastern Poland to the Sea of Azov is the district of the Ukraine, the home of the Little Russians or Ruthenians. Roughly this is the region included between the Dniester and Dnieper Rivers and coincides with the fertile "black-earth" district of Russia, the most productive cereal growing region in Europe. The Little Russians or Ruthenians of the Ukraine have had a most varied history. Settling in southern Russia in one of the most recent waves of Slav immigration, they were first welded into something like a southern Russian state with Kiev as their capital by Yaroslaff in the first half of the eleventh century. An attempt was made to introduce at least a veneer of Byzantine civilization. The kingdom lasted little more than a generation and the eastern part of the region was overrun by the Tartar invasion of the thirteenth century. In the fourteenth century the majority of the Ukraine was conquered by the expanding Lithuanian principality and was later included in the joint kingdom of Poland and Lithuania. In the middle of the seventeenth century an unsuccessful rebellion of the Ukraine led to the placing of the eastern portion under the suzerainty of Russia, but most of it remained with the Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom until the partitions. Austria obtained the Ruthenians of eastern Galicia by the first partition in 1772, and Russia secured the remaining portion by the partitions of 1793 and 1795. Within the last forty years there has developed a determined Ukrainian movement for independence from Russia which has been greatly stimulated by the same Russification policy that has been applied to the Finns, Letts,

Lithuanians and Poles. Racially the Ruthenians are the purest of the Russian Slavs and the best Russian exemplification of the Alpine race. They speak the purest of the Slavic dialects. Most of the inhabitants of the western Ukraine adhere to the curious Uniate Church. This was created in 1595 by the Union of Brest-Litovsk, according to the terms of which the Ukrainians of the Polish-Lithuanian kingdom were made to accept the supremacy of the Roman pontiff, while at the same time they were allowed to retain their Greek orthodox liturgy, ritual, ceremonial and organization. Further east the Ruthenians are divided between the Uniate and the Orthodox Churches. Liberal estimates place the total number of Ruthenians at about thirty millions, of whom some three and a half millions reside in Galicia, seven hundred thousand in the Carpathian district of Hungary and about fifty thousand in Bukowina. The others are, of course, found in southern Russia.

South and west of the home of the Poles and Ruthenians is found the land of the Czechs of Bohemia and Moravia and of the Slovaks of northern Hungary. Like the Poles, these peoples have had a distinguished past. Their Slavic ancestors came into this district during the sixth century and were organized into the first Bohemian state during the second quarter of the seventh century. Absorbed by the transitory Great Moravian Empire in the ninth century, Bohemia regained its independence in the tenth after the Magyars had overthrown the Moravians and absorbed the Slovaks. In 1068 it became an independent kingdom and during most of the fourteenth century its dynasty headed the Holy Roman Empire. The height of its prosperity was probably attained under Charles IV (1347-1378). The Hussite wars of the fifteenth century were not only of a religious nature, but were also a great national movement. In 1526, to gain the strength of unity against the Turks, the Bohemians accepted the personal leadership of the House of Hapsburg. Almost exactly a century later, as a result of the first episode of the Thirty Years' War, Bohemia lost its independence and there began a period

of ruthless Germanization and forcible conversion to Catholicism which for nearly two centuries seemed to have crushed out the national life of the Czechs. In the first half of the nineteenth century, however, this was rekindled by the reaction of the nationalistic aspects of the Napoleonic period upon Bohemia and by the arousing of Czechish interest in their national culture and history by a number of brilliant scholars, among them the linguist and philologist, Dobrovsky, the philosopher, Kollar, the archeologist, Safarik, and, above all the historian, Palacky. The national movement in the spring and early summer of 1848 was brought to a speedy and tragic end, but since 1868 the Czechs have maintained a steady campaign for the recognition of their national rights and aspirations by Vienna, the old Czech party demanding that Emperor Franz Joseph be formally crowned king of Bohemia at Prague, and the Young Czech party looking forward to the more aggressive and ambitious program of uniting with the Slovaks, Ruthenians and Jugo-Slavs in the attempt to make the Dual-Monarchy a Slavic state. Racially the Czechs are, of course, Slavs, being much taller and more broadheaded than the Poles and, to a lesser degree, than the Ruthenians. In Bohemia and Moravia, however, there are large minorities of Germans which constitute about 36 per cent of the total population in Bohemia and 29 per cent in Moravia. Czechs and Slovaks use the Slavonic dialect of the Czechs as their national literary language. In religion the great majority of the Czechs are Roman Catholic, while the Slovaks are fairly evenly divided between Catholics and Protestants, but religion plays little part in the present national complex of the Czecho-Slovaks. In 1910 it was estimated that there were about six and a half millions of Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia and slightly more than two millions of Slovaks in the Tatra districts of north-western Hungary.

Though the Magyars of Hungary are normally and quite correctly regarded as a dominating or governing nation, it is at the same time true that since 1526 they have been in varying degrees subject to the House of Hapsburg. The Hungarians, presumably, an off-shoot of the Finns, came

into the great plain of Hungary in the ninth century. They tried to push further westward into Germany but were decisively defeated by Otto the Great in 955. Receding into Hungary, the Magyars remained as a wedge separating the northern and southern Slavs of central Europe and were organized into a stable state by their first king, St. Stephen (997-1038). In the twelfth century they began their expansion southward through Croatia to the Adriatic. By 1200 they had been converted to Roman Catholicism and had very generally adopted European customs and institutions. In 1222 King Andreas II issued the famous Golden Bull which served as the constitution of Hungary until the revolution of 1848. In the thirteenth century Hungary was overrun by the great Mongol invasion from Asia; the Hungarian army was crushed in 1241 and the country devastated. Recovering from this disaster the Hungarians met a similar fate at the hands of Suleiman the Magnificent, the leader of the Turks, some three centuries later at the battle of the Mohacs, 1526. The Turks occupied the most of Hungary and turned the remainder over to the Hapsburgs. After the tragedy of Mohacs the Hungarians never regained their complete independence until the end of the present World War. In 1699, by the terms of the treaty of Karlowitz, that part of Hungary taken by the Turks was returned to Austria and until 1848 the Hungarians enjoyed a large degree of autonomy under the Hapsburg emperors who reigned as kings of Hungary. The promising revolution of 1848 failed primarily because the Magyars were unwilling to grant to the other nations of Hungary the same concessions from Budapest that the Magyars had succeeded in extorting from Vienna. After the creation of a temporarily independent Hungarian republic in the spring of 1849 the Magyars were overwhelmingly defeated by the Austrians and their Russian allies and were severely punished for their uprising. When the Hapsburgs were humbled by the double defeat of 1866, they found it necessary to placate the Hungarians by the arrangements of the *Ausgleich* of 1867, which created the Dual-Monarchy and raised Hungary nearly to a plane of

equality with Austria. This important concession did not, however, give Hungary independence and it was most unjust to the non-Magyar majority in Hungary. The Ausgleich was framed to make possible the German-Magyar repression of the Slavs, and the rule of the Magyars over their subject Slavs and Roumanians in the attempt to Magyarize all of Hungary has been more brutal and severe than that of any other state except Russia. The exact nature of the racial derivation of the present Magyar population of Hungary is unknown. Ripley holds that they are the products of the intermixture of an original Slavic population with a Finnish minority which entered the plain of Hungary in the ninth century, conquered the Slavs and imposed their Finnish language and culture. He believes that in the mixture of the two races the Slavs were much the more numerous and that the modern Magyar is about one-eighth Finnish and seven-eighths Slav, a fact which accounts for the present broadheadedness of the Magyars. The Hungarian language is a Finnish dialect with considerable evidence of borrowing from the Turks. In religion the Magyars have since their conversion to Roman Catholicism been overwhelmingly adherents to this cult though there are a few Protestants. In 1910 there were about ten millions of Magyars in Hungary, which was about forty per cent of the total population. The most important repressed nations were some three million Roumanians, two million Germans, about five million Slovaks, Croats and Serbs, and a half-million Ruthenians. The just and desirable readjustment of central Europe at the present peace conference will inevitably leave Hungary as one of the "small nations" of the future.

To the east of the Magyars and occupying the northern half of the great plain of the lower Danube are the Roumanians. The product of a considerable mixture of races, these people were gathered under a political organization in the Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia after the retirement of the Mongols who invaded this district in the thirteenth century. Under the leadership of Stephen the Great of Moldavia (1457-1504) they had

become a powerful military state and for a time fought off the Turks with success, but were later overcome by these Asiatic invaders. According to the terms of the treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji (1774) between Russia and the Turks, the latter were ordered to improve their rule in this region and further progress was made by the treaty of Adrianople in 1829 which secured for these two principalities practical autonomy from Turkey. In 1859 the inhabitants of Moldavia and Wallachia defied the Great Powers and united themselves in the joint Roumanian principality, which attained complete independence in 1878 by the treaty of Berlin and declared itself a kingdom in 1881. In recent years Roumanian nationalism has been greatly stimulated by the study of Roman colonization of Dacia and the attempt of Xenopol and the Roumanian historians to trace the relationship between the ancient Romans and the modern Roumanians. The racial composition of the Roumanians is a complicated question. Ripley believes that the original substratum of the Roumanian people was an ancient Eurafrian population like that which originally settled Russia and constituted the progenitors of the Nordic race. Among these there settled a considerable number of Roman colonists in the second century A. D. In the west the Slavs came in very large numbers following the sixth century. In the thirteenth century the Mongols swept over this district, and in the sixteenth the Turks conquered it. As a consequence, Roumania is not homogeneous racially, but shows the predominant influence of the Slavs in the west and of the primordial long headed Eurafrian stock in the east. The Roumanians vary from very broadheaded in the Transylvanian district of Hungary to relatively longheaded in the region of the delta of the Danube, and are uniformly short and stocky in stature. The language of modern Roumania is a Roman dialect resembling classical Latin almost as much as some of the variations of medieval Latin. This is in well-nigh universal use today among Roumanians. Perpetuated in parts of this region from classical times, this language has become a vital element of recent Roumanian nationalism and has been sys-

tematically extended and adopted since 1860, to the general exclusion of the previous Slavic and Turkish dialects. In religion the Roumanians are chiefly Greek Orthodox. There are about ten and a half millions of the Roumanians, some six and a quarter millions living in Roumania proper, two and three quarters' millions in Transylvania, a little over a million in Bessarabia, two hundred and seventy-five thousand in the eastern Bukowina and about forty thousand in northeastern Serbia. Added to these there are about a million and a quarter non-Roumanians living in the pre-war Roumanian state.

Across the Danube to the south of Roumania are to be found the Bulgarians. Populated originally by the same longheaded Eurafrican race that had settled the Roumanian portion of the lower Danubian plain, this district was invaded in the latter part of the seventh century by the Bulgars, an off-shoot of the Finns. They founded in 679 the first Bulgarian kingdom, which endured until the conquest of Bulgaria by the Byzantine Empire in 1018. Under Czar Simeon (893-927) the Bulgarian kingdom developed to considerable proportions and became the strongest of the Balkan states. Recovering from the Byzantine conquest the Bulgars established a second kingdom in 1186 which reached the height of its power under Ivan Asên II (1218-1241). In the middle of the thirteenth century Bulgaria was ravaged by the Mongols and was finally conquered by the incoming Turks between 1340 and 1396. The beginning of the Bulgarian national revival dates from about 1830. The brutality of the Turks in Bulgaria in 1876 precipitated the momentous Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878. By the treaty of Berlin of 1878 Bulgaria was granted autonomy from the Turk, but was unnaturally separated into two principalities, Bulgaria and East Roumelia. In 1885, the Bulgars broke down this artificial division and formed the united principality of Bulgaria. Twenty-three years later the Bulgars took advantage of the embarrassment of the Turks during the civil war of 1908 and declared their independence of Turkey and proclaimed Bulgaria as a kingdom. By the unfortunate second

Balkan War of 1913 Bulgaria was estranged from the other Balkan states. Racially the Bulgarians are highly composite. In the west the contact with the Slavs has made the Alpine racial characteristics most prominent, while in the east the traits of the primordial Eurafrican or proto-Nordic race prevail. The Finnish or Bulgar invaders of the seventh century have had almost no significance for Bulgaria other than political. Racially they have long been assimilated in the original population and in the neighboring and invading Slavs. Turkish occupation has left traces of the Asiatic racial traits. Swarthy in complexion and short in stature, the Bulgars vary from extreme broadheadedness in the west to longheaded in the east. The Bulgarian language is now a definite Slavonic dialect, the original Finnish language has definitely disappeared centuries ago. In religion the Bulgarians are solidly Greek Orthodox, but the Bulgarian church is independent of the organization of the Greek Church. The best estimates put the truly Bulgar population of Bulgaria at about four millions at the outbreak of the World War, which number constituted about 75 per cent of the total population. In addition to these there were about a million and a quarter Bulgarians in southern Macedonia under Serbian rule and a very considerable number in the hinterland of the northern Aegean in the Dobrudja district and in the portion of Turkey adjoining Bulgaria.

Extending eastward from the western boundary of Bulgaria to the head of the Adriatic Sea is found the home of the Jugo-Slavs (i.e., the Southern Slavs), the Slovenes of Carniola and adjacent districts, the Croats of Croatia, the Serbo-Croats of Slavonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Serbs of Serbia and Montenegro. The Jugo-Slavs are the southern contingent of that general Slav incursion into central Europe in the sixth and seventh centuries. They were separated from their northern kinsmen in the ninth century by the Magyar invasion which drove a wedge between the two branches of the western vanguard of the Slavs. The Slovenes have never created an independent state, but have alternated between German and Italian

control and are to-day primarily Germanic in most phases of their culture other than their language. Croatia was the first of the Jugo-Slav districts to develop a strong and coherent political organization. From 800 to about 1100 Croatia enjoyed a distinguished existence as an independent duchy and then as a kingdom, but from the beginning of the twelfth century to the present most of it has been controlled by Hungary. Serbia became a powerful kingdom in the thirteenth century and under Stephen Dushan (1331-1355) developed into the most extensive Balkan power that has existed since the decline of the Macedonian Empire. The independent Serbian kingdom was terminated by the Turks at the Battle of Kossove in 1389, and by 1459 the southern Slavs were completely conquered by the invading Turk. Serbia remained in a condition of subjection until the beginning of the national revolt in 1804. The right of self-government was obtained in 1830 and complete independence recognized in 1878. In 1903 the corrupt and Austrophile Obrenovitch dynasty was eliminated by the brutal assassination of the royal family. The rival Karageorgevitch dynasty which succeeded to the throne, in spite of its disgraceful mode of regaining power, brought to Serbia a more liberal and efficient political system and encouraged a revival of Serbian national sentiment, which has been intensified by Austrian aggression in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 and the creation of Albania in 1913. The little mountain kingdom of Montenegro can boast of having been the only Slavic state of the Balkan peninsula to defy Turkish conquest. After three centuries of ineffectual attempts to conquer these warlike Serbs the Turks recognized their autonomy in 1799 and their complete independence in 1878. From the standpoint of race the Jugo-Slavs are the purest and finest type of Alpine Slavs. This is probably due to their more isolated habitat which has prevented as much intermixture of races as in central and eastern Europe. They are very tall and broadheaded brunets, of so fine a physical type that Deniker has designated them as a separate race—the Dinaric, but, as there is no doubt that they are true

Alpines, this attempt to classify them as a distinct sub-type seems but a needless further complication of an already high confusing subject. The Slovene language differs from the Serbo-Croat, but is an allied dialect. The Serbian language is the purest Slav dialect of the Balkan peninsula and the Croatian language is merely Serb written in Latin characters. In religion the Slovenes and the Croatians are Roman Catholic, while the Serbs are Greek Orthodox. The total population of the territory inhabited by the Jugo-Slavs is estimated at about fourteen millions, of whom at least ten millions are Jugo-Slavs. Of the Jugo-Slavs a little over eight millions are Serbo-Croats and the remainder mainly Slovenes.

To the southwest of Serbia lies the little mountain state of Albania. Inhabited by a group of hardy, primitive and warlike mountaineers, Albania, by a fiat of the Austrian government, was advanced in 1913 from a tribal condition to independent statehood in the effort of Vienna to shut off Serbia from an outlet to the Adriatic. Albania has had no distinct history but has existed as a group of warring tribes since classical days. Racially the Albanians are regarded by Ripley as identical with the Serbo-Croats. In culture the Albanians are a strange mixture of Greek, Slav, Turk and Italian. In religion the Albanians are divided between the Mohammedans, Greek Orthodox and Roman Catholics the Moslems being the most numerous. Certainly southern Albania or northern Epirus belongs to the Greeks on the basis of both culture and national feeling. It is estimated that there are a little more than one million Albanians out of a total of a million and a half inhabitants living in the Albanian state.

The southernmost extension of the Balkan peninsula is the habitat of the Greeks, who, whatever the actuality, regard themselves as the descendants of the Greeks of the age of Pericles and Aristotle. The Greeks were conquered by the Romans in 146 B.C., but retained most phases of their culture and imposed it upon the Byzantine Empire founded by Constantine in 330 A.D. The Greeks remained under the control of the Eastern Empire until the occupa-

tion of Hellas by the Turks between 1423 and 1460, except for a short period following the fourth crusade (1204-1261), when a Latin empire was established, and the later temporary conquest of a part of Greece by Stephen Dushan in the middle of the fourteenth century. By their own gallant efforts and through the aid of Russia, France and England the Greeks were awarded their independence in the treaty of Adrianople (1829) and established as a kingdom in 1832. Receiving some territory by the treaty of Berlin (1878) the Greeks have since made great strides in advance, especially after 1909 under the leadership of their exceedingly able and statesmanlike premier, Eleutherios Venezelos, who reorganized the Greek state and prepared it for the victorious war against the Turks in 1912-1913, by which Greece was greatly increased in population, territory and prestige. The modern Greek prides himself not only upon this cultural heritage from classical Greece, but also maintains his direct physical descent from the Attic Greeks. In spite of many invasions of the Greek peninsula between classical times and today by non-Greek peoples, such as Avars and Slavs, it is true that in some districts, especially in Thessaly, Attica and the Peloponnesus, the modern Greek has retained the characteristics of the original Mediterranean race to a remarkable degree. The "Greeks" of Asia can scarcely be regarded as Greek in anything else than national feeling and some superficial aspects of culture. The Greeks speak a language which is a debased form of the ancient Attic Greek, but since the Hellenic revival of the last century it has been systematically improved and brought back closer to the classical form. In religion the Greeks belong almost without exception to the Greek Orthodox Church. There are about four million seven hundred thousand Greeks in the Greek state, about two millions in the Aegean Islands and along the coast of Asia Minor, some one hundred and fifty thousand in Epirus, nearly two hundred thousand in Macedonia, about three hundred and fifty thousand in the city of Constantinople and about four hundred thousand in western Thrace, where they constitute a majority of the population.

If space were available one might carry this discussion into a consideration of the disputed territory in western Asia, such as Georgia, Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Persia, Arabia and the new proposed Jewish state in Palestine, but this territory involves problems of so widely different a character and such relative ease of solution that they may be passed over with this mere allusion.

III. NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE

The principle of national self-determination as applied to the reconstruction of Europe means in its most fundamental and general sense the redrawing of the map of Europe so that state lines will coincide as far as possible with the ethnographic boundaries of the distinct national units which have been heretofore either thwarted in obtaining complete political unity or denied any political independence and existence whatever. This guiding tenet of nationality must, however, be accepted with reservations and should be governed by general good judgment and common sense, or its enforcement will merely result in a return to something near complete political anarchy. As Mr. Zimmern has pointed out,

If the sentiment of nationality were admitted as a sole and sufficient claim for a change of government French Canada would pass to France, Wisconsin to Germany, and part of Minnesota to Norway, while the New York police would become servants of the new Home Rule government in Ireland. The theory which makes national feeling the criterion of Statehood can easily be reduced to an absurdity.³

Were there available space it would be most instructive to summarize what is known about the claims presented by the small nations at the peace conference. It is perfectly obvious that in many if not most cases the claims have embraced all the territory to which the most shadowy pretensions could be advanced, apparently in the hope that after extensive reductions in the original claims the territory assigned would be somewhat more than what each nation

³ A. E. Zimmern, *Nationality and Government*, p. 49.

could hope to receive on the basis of the facts in the case. Such representative conflicting claims as those of Italy and Jugo-Slavia to Dalmatia, Istria, Fiume and Trieste; of Albania and Greece to Epirus; of Greece and Bulgaria to Macedonia and Thrace; of Greece and Italy to the Dodecanese Islands; of Serbia and Bulgaria to western Macedonia; of Roumania and Bulgaria to the Dobrudja; of Roumania and Serbia to the Banat; of Roumania and the Ruthenians of Galicia to Bukowina; of Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and the Ukraine to eastern Galicia; of Poland and the Ukraine over their boundary line; of Poland to Lithuania; of Czecho-Slovakia and Poland to upper Silesia; and of the Poles and Germans to West Prussia afford overwhelming proof that the principle of strict fairness and a conciliatory and compromising policy have not guided these states or potential states in their approach to Paris. They have apparently decided to stake the future of their nation upon the success which attends their "higgling in the boundary market at Paris." While these extreme claims put forth by the small nations create political and diplomatic problems of the first magnitude, they are so obviously out of accord with a true application of the national principle in the contested regions that they may be passed over with no further mention. Attention may be given to a brief survey of what the most competent and relatively disinterested authorities regard as the settlement of conflicting claims in the contested parts of Europe which would be compatible with the principle of nationality.

In the settlement of the problems of nationality in Western Europe, there seems little disagreement as to the desirability of allowing Ireland to experiment with home rule, of consenting to the French re-annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, of permitting Luxemburg to join itself to Belgium and of giving assent to the annexation of the definitely Danish portion of Schleswig to Denmark.⁴ To pass to that disputed mid-European district once more, Finland should

⁴ These solutions proposed are in no way necessarily the personal opinions of the writer, but are those selected on account of the reputation of their authors for knowledge and fairness and evident desire to promote the future peace of Europe.

certainly be given independence from Russia, but the Aland Islands should be handed over to Sweden with the guarantee that they remain unfortified and shall never be used as a naval base. Further, there can be little doubt that the Finns of Esthonia should be induced to unite in one government with their kinsmen in Finland and the natural process of political evolution would be forwarded by at least a loose federation of the Finns of both Finland and Esthonia with the Letts in the Baltic provinces. That the Letts of the Baltic provinces should have their independence from Russia will not be denied, though it is quite evident that the Letts cannot preserve a prosperous national existence without some sort of a union with the Finns or Lithuanians and without freedom from the economic oppression of the German and Polish landlords. Lithuanian aspirations for independence must also be admitted as just, and it seems most desirable that the Lithuanians be united with the Letts for their mutual economic benefit, though there is no doubt that in any such arrangement religious toleration should be assured and Russia should be guaranteed commercial access to Riga. Further, a commercial union between Poland and a Letto-Lithuanian state would be most desirable for all parties concerned.

An independent Poland has been a hope of liberals from the beginning of the Great War. The nucleus of the restored Poland must, of course, be the strictly Polish Russian Poland. To this should be added from territory within the German Empire the Polish portions of Posen and Silesia and the Protestant Poles of the Masurian districts of East Prussia, if the latter so desire. While the Vistula and the port of Danzig should both be internationalized and Poland should have the territory along the Vistula up to and including Thorn, there is little doubt that she should relinquish for the future good of herself and Europe the ambition to regain all West Prussia and Danzig, though there is no doubt that she should receive sound guarantees of Polish cultural and economic autonomy in West Prussia. From Austria, Poland should undoubtedly obtain western Galicia, but the attempt to claim Galicia as far as Lemberg is clearly

absurd, whatever the composition of the population of Lemberg. Equally unjustifiable is the Polish claim to Lithuania as far as Vilna. Without the avowed desire of the Lithuanians to unite with Poland the latter can advance no valid claim, ethnic or historical, to the possession of any distinctly Lithuanian districts.⁵ The national aspirations of the Ukraine to political independence certainly demand respect, at least until it is able to obtain the grant of autonomy within a liberalized Russia. An independent Ukraine could not exist without control of Odessa, but some arrangement would have to be made with Russia in this case which would assure Russian access to this great Black Sea port. There is little doubt but that the Ruthenians of eastern Galicia should be joined with the remainder of the Ukraine, whether the Little Russians maintain complete independence or effect some sort of a liberal union with Russia. Geographical conditions would probably exclude from this union the Ruthenians in Hungary south of the Carpathians, but the Ruthenians of Bukowina would unquestionably be included in any united Ukraine state or province. The sub-Carpathian Ruthenians should be allowed the right of migration. The new Czecho-Slovak state must doubtless be assigned Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia. The disputed portions of Austrian Silesia must be neutralized or divided with Poland. Geographical conditions make it practically impossible for the three million three hundred thousand Germans dwelling around the north-western rim of Bohemia to join their kinsmen across the Erz Gebirge, and they will have to be granted cultural autonomy and political equality in the new state. Absolutely lacking an outlet to the sea, the Czecho-Slovak state will be compelled to develop favorable commercial relations with the Germans, Poles, Ruthenians and Roumanians in order to secure access to some port.⁶ Though possessing

⁵ A map indicating a very fair solution of the Polish boundaries according to the principle of nationality is to be found in A. J. Toynbee, *Nationality and the War*, opposite p. 51. See pp. 73 ff for his arguments against detaching all of West Prussia from the German Empire.

⁶ Such access is provided for in the treaty submitted to Germany.

the richest cultural background of any Slavic group, the new Czecho-Slovak state will have to develop industrially and commercially if it is to have a distinguished future. The Magyars can scarcely expect less than the total loss of all non-Magyar portions of Hungary, but they will, without doubt, be compensated in part by complete independence from Austria. Like the Czecho-Slovaks they will require an outlet to the sea, which may be obtained through Roumania in return for the surrender of the territory held by the eight hundred thousand Magyars of Transylvania.

We may now turn to the Balkan districts. On the basis of nationality Roumania would be assigned Transylvania and, perhaps, a portion of the adjoining Hungarian plain of Alföld in which the Roumanians predominate. Roumania could also justly claim the eastern portion of Bukowina, the definitely Roumanian portions of the Banat of Temesvar, and at least that half of Bessarabia lying next to Moldavia. Indeed, it would probably be advisable to extend the eastern boundary of Roumania to the Dniester River, but any claim to Odessa would be most unjustifiable. Further, it would seem very desirable that Roumania should surrender to Bulgaria the Dobrudja south of Constanza. The rigorous upholders of the doctrine of punitive justice would doubtless regard Bulgaria as a fit subject for partition among the Balkan states which allied themselves with the western Powers, but such a view could not be regarded as far-sighted or motivated by a sincere desire to promote the peace of Europe. If the defeated Powers are to be expected to submit to the application of the principle of national self-determination when it operates to their detriment they cannot be denied any benefits which may occasionally accrue to them on this basis. Then, it has never been demonstrated that the Bulgarian people have been sympathetic with Pan-Germanism. Bulgaria was urged to enter the second Balkan War by treacherous advice from Vienna and her treatment by the other Balkan states at the close of this war did not reflect credit upon the latter. The entry of Bulgaria into the War of the Nations on the side of Germany was not the act of the Bulgarian people, nor,

probably, even the wish of Czar Ferdinand; rather it seems to have been the result of inexcusable diplomatic bungling on the part of the western Allies who were unwilling to grant Bulgaria's just claims to Macedonia as the price of her active aid or to guarantee her protection from Germany in case of further neutrality.⁷ If the national principle is applied to the adjustment of the Bulgarian boundary it would certainly require the cession to Bulgaria of Macedonia south of the Shar Mountains, of Dobrudja south of Constanza, and of eastern Thrace and Adrianople. Further, Greece should be required to guarantee the commercial access of Bulgaria to Kavala, and, while Greece should doubtless be given possession of the entire northern coast of the Aegean, there can be no question that Bulgaria should be assigned much of the inland region now held or claimed by Greece. The new Jugo-Slav state, by the principle of nationality, will receive most extensive additions. These would certainly include Carinthia, Styria, Carniola and Küstenland, Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the disputed Adriatic region it would seem that if Italy obtains Trieste and Istria, the Jugo-Slavs would certainly be entitled to Fiume. It would further appear that the probable future peace of both Italy and Jugo-Slavia, and incidentally of Europe, would be greatly promoted by the neutralization of the Adriatic Sea. Serbia also has a definite national claim to a part of the Banat, though this may be surrendered to Roumania in consideration of Roumania's relinquishing any claim to the Roumanians now dwelling in Serbia. While Montenegro should not be forced against her will into the Jugo-Slav state, it is obvious that it would be to the distinct advantage of all parties concerned if such an agreement could be reached in a harmonious manner. The inclusion of Albania with a large amount of autonomy for the latter would also be most desirable. If Albania is to remain a separate state, national considerations demand that she surrender northern Epirus to Greece and receive

⁷ For a convincing summary of the relation of Allied stupidity to Bulgaria's alliance with Germany see J. D. Bouchier, in *The Atlantic Monthly*, March, 1919. pp. 415-16.

in return considerable Albanian territory in the north and east in Montenegro and Serbia and towards the south-east in Greece. An independent Albania would for a time certainly be a proper field for supervision by a mandatory power. A just respect for the national claims of Greece would require that she secure northern Epirus, the northern coast of the Aegean, but with a guarantee of Bulgarian access and the surrender of the inland districts to Bulgaria, western Thrace, the coast of Asia Minor, the islands of the Aegean, including the Dodecanese Islands now held by Italy, and the island of Cyprus. In view of this allotment, Greece should by all means be required to guarantee the inland districts of Asia Minor commercial access to the Aegean ports, especially to that of Smyrna.

The principle of nationality will doubtless, and in justice must be, applied to the reconstruction of western Asia, which has at last been freed from the rule of the intolerable Turk. While the Turk can claim, under the cover of the national principle, a more or less independent state in Asia Minor, national independence should certainly be extended to Georgia, Armenia, Syria, Palestine, Arabia and Persia. The internal peace and order of these new states and their security against foreign aggression should, and doubtless will be, guaranteed through their supervision by a more advanced and powerful state according to the mandatory system. The candid analyst of political reconstruction on the basis of nationality will also be likely to be skeptical of any reasons brought forward to deny the application of the principle to Egypt and Korea, though it might readily be conceded that the mandatory power in these cases should be exercised by Great Britain and Japan respectively. As the Monroe Doctrine is embodied in the covenant of the League of Nations, it will devolve upon the United States to compel the respect of the principle of nationality in the Western hemisphere and to require the "small nations" of this half of the world to respect the dictates of international law and morality.⁸

⁸ For a brief consideration of the important problem of the relation of the League of Nations to these "small nations" see S. P. Duggan (Editor), *The League of Nations: The Principle and the Practice*, chapter ix.